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Abstract 
Because of a long time frame, irreversible and specific investments, incomplete contracts and 
political constraints, it is generally difficult for governments to commit themselves in a credible 
way to a fixed petroleum tax regime. Many controversial renegotiations and tightenings of such 
systems have occurred internationally over the past couple of years. By contrast, Norway has 
succeeded in building credibility as a reasonable tax collector because the government initially 
tailored  the  rates  imposed  to  economic,  geological  and  technological  conditions,  and then 
gradually  changed  into  a  neutral  and  stable  tax  system. This chapter  applies  game  theoretic 
models on  commitment  and  time  consistency  to  petroleum  taxation,  and  identifies  special 
conditions in this industry which complicate a credible commitment. The Norwegian tax system is 
used as a case. The Norwegian model of petroleum resource administration is outlined, and it is 
discussed under what conditions this may represent a good system.  
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Operating as they do in some of the world s more unpredictable and unstable countries, petroleum 
companies face considerable political risk. A hot topic in the energy sector at present is the 
expropriation of investment by host states. According to Erkan (2008), direct expropriation has 
been rather exceptional over the past two decades and has been replaced by indirect (creeping and 
regulatory) expropriation.  
The question of the ability and willingness of governments to commit themselves to a fixed 
policy is relevant to a number of aspects of economic policy. It is particularly important in relation 
to industry s long-term frame conditions.  
Many central banks conduct monetary policy in accordance with a fixed rule, typically the 
stabilisation of inflation. Kydland and Prescott were awarded the Nobel Prize for economic 
sciences in 2004 for demonstrating how the effects of expectations about future economic policy 
can give rise to a time consistency problem. If economic policymakers are unable to commit in 
advance to a specific decision-making rule, they will often fail to implement the most desirable 
policy later on
1. Kydland and Prescott's results offered a common explanation for events which, 
until then, had been interpreted as separate policy failures - when economies become trapped in 
high inflation, for instance, even though price stability is the stated objective of monetary policy. 
This research shifted the practical discussion of economic policy away from isolated policy 
measures towards the institutions of policymaking, a shift which has largely influenced the 
reforms of central banks and the design of monetary policy in many countries over the past 
decade. The concept of time consistency in planning is general, however, and also applies to 
taxation of natural resource industries like petroleum and mining.  
In so far as it is feasible, commitment also represents a desirable quality in petroleum 
taxation. This may explain the presence of fiscal stability clauses in petroleum contracts, see 
Daniel and Sunley (2008). The major challenge in attracting petroleum investments is the high 
level of frond end loading of investments.  After petroleum companies have made large 
irreversible investments in production and distribution facilities, a government can achieve a short-
term gain by increasing taxes above the level which the companies were led to expect when 
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development began. The problem facing the government, however, is that oil companies may 
expect this type of tax behaviour.Thus, it is important to apply a dynamic economic analysis in this 
case. The dynamics here will lie in the expectations of the companies about a government s future 
tax policy. An unexpected tax increase is likely to lead to an upgrading of company expectations 
about the taxation of future developments. Moreover, an opportunistic and state-contingent tax 
policy will increase uncertainty about the future level of rates. The companies will now face 
political as well as technical and financial risk; political risk not only counting dramatic changes in 
tax and regulatory regimes, but also minor deviations from announced policies.After upgrading 
both the expected size of and level of uncertainty about the tax burden, the companies will be less 
interested in participating in future licences. It is also reasonable to assume that they will change 
their attitude to existing fields in the direction of a more short-term approach. The emphasis will 
shift towards faster pay-back at the expense of long-term reservoir utilisation. Taken together, 
these considerations will  for reasonable discount rates - reduce future tax revenues by a greater 
amount than the short-term gain.  
Special conditions in the petroleum industry which inhibit credible commitment are discussed 
in section 2. Section 3 applies existing literature on the commitment issue (principal-agent theory 
and signalling games) to the petroleum industry. Efforts are made to characterise Norwegian 
policy in section 4 along the commitment-opportunism dimension, and I discuss the opportunities 
available to the government to commit itself to a fixed tax policy on the Norwegian continental 
shelf (NCS). With the exception of section 3, which is technical, the chapter is written so that it 
would be accessible to a broad group of readers. It is also written so that readers may skip section 
3.    
2. Special conditions in the petroleum industry 
Credible commitment on future tax policy is generally important in providing the right investment 
incentives. Fears of future tax rises can yield welfare losses as a result of under-investment. In this 
context, under-investment can take two forms: 1) the overall development of the NCS falls below 
the level that an optimum pace of production would indicate and 2) spending on individual fields 
could be below the desirable level - in other words, the balance between investment and operation 
expenditure is sub-optimal. Welfare (deadweight) losses from distortions in the form of under- 
 
investment represent a particularly important problem in a capital-intensive industry such as 
petroleum production. An additional problem for recovery of non-renewable resources is that the 
absence of a credible tax policy can also yield losses in the real economy by distorting production 
decisions. Examples of the latter is that absence of credibility could lead to a speed-up in 
production and thereby sub-optimum reservoir management and a low recovery factor (i.e., a 
lower fraction of the overall reserves will be extracted) For the sake of simplicity, the presentation 
below will focus on the problem of under-investment (the problem of speeded-up production is 
analogous). The relative size of the problems of underinvestment and sup-optimal reservoir 
drainage will depend on the level of monitoring and control by the resource authorities. Sub-
optimal reservoir drainage can to some extent be detected by the resource authorities. 
Underinvestment is perhaps less detectable, as some of the investment options may not be known 
to the government. The problems associated with the lack of credible commitment by the 
government with respect to taxation bears resemblance to the problems of weak property rights. 
Bohn and Deacon (2000) show empirical evidence of slow extraction in oil as a consequence of 
weak property rights.   
A number of conditions in the petroleum industry make it particularly difficult for a 
government to achieve credible commitment where taxation is concerned. One obvious problem is 
the long time frame for both individual fields and overall activity. Exploration operations are time-
consuming, field development takes several years, and a reservoir may produce petroleum for 
more than three decades. The planning horizon for an individual field is accordingly very long. 
Moreover, expectations of new discoveries mean that the time frame for the industry as a whole is 
substantially longer. This lengthy planning horizon for both government and companies means 
that dynamic aspects are more important than in most other industries.  
Other relevant considerations are a high petroleum rent and the lock-in of major investments, 
which make it particularly tempting for governments to secure short-term gains. Capital spending 
on production installations and transport systems account for the bulk of costs on the NCS. These 
are tailored facilities with a low alternative value
2. After specific and irreversible investments have 
been made on the NCS, the government could impose high taxes without suffering appreciable 
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static deadweight losses. The tax base is relatively inelastic. However, such a policy would incur a 
dynamic welfare loss through changed expectations by the companies about the government s 
future tax policy.  
Another aspect of the commitment issue is that the government is limited to incomplete 
contracts. Full commitment would mean complete long-term contracts. Long-term commitment is 
constrained by institutional conditions, as discussed below. Complete contracts would have to 
specify tax rates for all possible future conditions. All future renegotiations of the tax system 
would then be unnecessary, as the tax contracts would contain conditions regulating cases of both 
extremely low and extremely high oil prices, extreme variations in resource potential, extreme cost 
variations; and different combinations of all those contingencies.The petroleum industry is 
characterised by a high level of economic and technological complexity. It would thus be 
impossible to predict all future outcomes relating to costs, technology, reserve estimates and 
prices. Such extensive contracts would also involve substantial transaction costs.  
A problem related to incomplete contracts is that a great many petroleum tax instruments have 
been developed by the government over the years. Even if central rates were fixed, ex post rises in 
the tax burden could be achieved by adjusting one or several other factors which are significant for 
assessed taxes. One example could be changes to tax-free allowances. New rules could also be 
adopted on which expenses are deductible. Such deductions include many estimated costs and 
non-standard input factors which have no established market price. These are often delivered by 
companies in the same group. It is difficult to develop clear rules in advance for such discretionary 
deductions. Companies also run the risk that the government will introduce new types of taxation 
in the future to supplement existing forms. All sorts of environmental taxes are a case in point.  
An important institutional constraint on the government s opportunities for credible 
commitment in tax policy is provided by the constitutional principle that today s elected 
representatives cannot bind a future Storting (parliament).
3 This issue is common for all forms of 
taxation, but is perhaps particularly important for the petroleum sector because of the size of the 
government s tax take and the long-term nature of the business. The petroleum sector is so 
significant for the Norwegian economy that making very strong commitments on the future 
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taxation of this industry could be a matter of democratic concern, even though they might enjoy 
broad support in today s Storting.  
In addition to the provisions of the constitutions, the government will also face political 
constraints on possible attempts to establish a credible committed petroleum tax regime. A 
relevant consideration in this context is that Norwegian voters dislike big profits and high 
dividends at private petroleum companies (perhaps particularly when these are foreign-owned). 
This gives the impression that a national natural resources which belongs to the community is 
under-taxed. The government accordingly faces problems in committing itself in a credible way 
not to introduce extraordinary taxation when times are particularly good. An underlying media 
reality is that, as oil prices and the US dollar exchange rate against the Norwegian krone rise, it 
will be tempting for journalists to assert that private interests and foreigners are capturing an 
excessive share of Norway s petroleum wealth. The fact that the same investors lose money in bad 
times is not such an interesting subject to write about.  
These features of political constraints are by no means unique to the Norwegian petroleum 
sector - which has a very favourable score on indices of political risk. The principles apply 
generally to petroleum and mining countries.    
3. Economic theory on commitment applied to the taxation of non-renewable natural 
resources 
In this section, I will apply established models from game theory and regulation theory in order to 
illustrate the problem of commitment faced by the government on the NCS
4.  
3.1 Repeated game 
The Norwegian government has chosen a policy of gradual recovery for the country s petroleum 
reserves, and very largely the same companies submit applications in each licensing round. The 
licensing process can therefore be regarded as being close to a repeated game. The first best tax 
policy will be for the government to commit to a fixed approach. After the companies have made 
specific and irreversible investments in period one, however, the government will have incentives 
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to raisetaxation in period two. This is because its assumed goal of maximising welfare means that 
it wishes to secure a given tax take with a minimum of distortions, and taxing irreversible 
investments does not cause (static) deadweight losses. The problem with the commitment game 
lies in the fact that it is not renegiotiation proof (not subgame perfect). Because the government 
will wish to re-optimise in period two, the first best tax policy - which involves commitment - is 
not credible (not dynamically inconsistent
5). As a result, the companies will not regard the 
government s attempts at commitment as credible and will expect it to behave opportunistically in 
each period. Given these expectations, this is also the best approach for the government. The 
equilibrium which arises in such simple models for repeated games is characterised by under-
investment on the NCS.  
To reduce the problem of under-investment, the government will want to commit itself in a 
credible way to a reasonable level of taxation. In principle, this can be achieved by developing a 
reputation for sticking to a non-confiscatory tax rule or by creating institutional arrangements 
which penalise the authorities if they depart from such a rule. Reputation or institutional 
arrangements can be a partial substitute for long-term state-contingent contracts and reduce to 
some extent the problem of under-investment.  
One institutional arrangement proposed in Norway to enhance the government s credibility in 
terms of commitment is to use the constitution. The idea is that a constitutional provision will 
effectively commit the authorities since amending the constitution is time consuming and requires 
a qualified majority in the Storting. However, the long planning horizon required in the petroleum 
industry means that a four-year process to amend the constitution will not be much help. Nor will 
the requirement for a qualified majority necessarily be any great assistance because of the 
temptation to secure a high tax take in the short term. To all intents and purposes, therefore, the 
government will have to concentrate on reputational effects in a possible attempt to create a 
credible commitment to the petroleum tax regime.  
Simple models for repeated games predict an opportunistic tax policy with the absence of 
credible opportunities for commitment. Taking this to its logical conclusion could mean, for 
example, nationalisation of locked-in investment made by foreign companies on the NCS. Since 
Norway has an open economy and is an integrated member of the international community, the 
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companies will not regard this as a likely pattern of action. Although the Norwegian government is 
not expected to implement drastic nationalisation measures, and thereby has greater credibility 
than politically unstable countries with a smaller degree of international integration - or countries 
where nationalistic aspects are more dominant than pragmatic rent collection - it will still be 
necessary to build a reputation for abstaining from more drastic measures which provide an ex 
post increase in the tax burden.  
In analysing the dynamic taxation problem, I will consider two categories of games: those 
with complete and incomplete information about what type of tax collector the Norwegian 
government is. The latter is by definition free to re-optimise in each period - in other words, 
credible commitment is basically regarded as unattainable
6.  
In a game with complete information, the companies are assumed to know the government s 
goal: to capture the largest possible share of the petroleum rent while simultaneously taking 
account of the fact that the tax system will affect the size of this rent. In a simple model with a 
finite time frame (T periods), sub-optimum investment will be unavoidable in the equilibrium 
state. The explanation is as follows. The government s policy in period T cannot affect future tax 
revenues. Period T is therefore in reality a one-period game, and the government will choose the 
dominant strategy with high ex post taxation. The petroleum companies, who are assumed to have 
complete information, will foresee the government s strategy in period T. As a result, equilibrium 
in period T-1 will not influence the future. The government will again choose the dominant 
strategy, and through backward induction equilibrium is characterised by high taxation and sub-
optimum investment in each period.  
In a model with an infinite time frame, the under-investment problem can be reduced by 
adopting suitable trigger strategies. Strictly speaking, the game between the government and the 
petroleum companies will not have an infinite time frame, since petroleum is a scarce non-
renewable resource. An infinite time frame can nevertheless be defended by assuming a stochastic 
end date for operations on the NCS. This is a reasonable expectation given that exploration yields 
the discovery of additional reserves and production experience leads to the upgrading of estimated 
reserve in existing fields. 
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Characterised by the following expectations, it is possible to achieve a sequentially rational 
equilibrium without under-investment. The companies expect a reasonable level of taxation if this 
has been observed earlier. Should the government deviate from that pattern of behaviour, heavy 
taxation is expected for the following n periods. The government will not now choose the 
dominant one-period policy of heavy taxation, since the gain in the present period is not 
sufficiently large to offset the loss of tax revenues as a consequence of under-investment in the 
following n periods.  
The companies may have incomplete information about the government s preferences over 
petroleum taxation. That could be the case with a change of government, for instance. By 
observing actual tax policy over time, however, the companies will form a picture of the 
government s priorities. A model which solves the problem of under-investment is a finite time-
frame solution where the government is one of two possible types - weak or tough - and where the 
companies are assumed to have incomplete information about which type it is. The weak type will 
give the companies a reasonable return in each period, while the other alternative s preferences 
take the form of a ruthless pursuit of revenues. In the final period, it is pointless for the 
government to develop a reputation as a reasonable tax collector. The tough type will accordingly 
opt for high taxes. Earlier in the game, however, the tough type will have an incentive to pass itself 
off as weak in order to encourage investment on the NCS. This imitation strategy involves 
imposing a reasonable tax burden and thereby building a reputation as a reasonable tax collector. 
A high level of taxation would have yielded high revenues in the short term, and thereby an 
immediate efficiency gain in that taxes which cause distortions in other sectors could be reduced. 
This short-term gain must be balanced against the long-term cost of under-investment as a 
consequence of revealing that the government is a tough type. If the government has a good 
reputation at the start of the signalling game and is a patient player, it might be willing to accept a 
short-term loss of tax revenues in order to build and entrench a reputation.  
3.2 Dynamic regulation models 
Regulation theory presumes asymmetrical information between the various parties in a contractual 
relationship. Through their activities, the companies acquire private information - in other words, 
information not directly available to the government (asymmetric information). Examples of  
 
asymmetric information about relevant economic conditions include development and operating 
costs, reservoir estimates by the companies and their required rates of return.  
Private information would not represent a problem if it were possible to ask the companies for 
relevant data and expect a truthful report. However, it is worth noting that their assumed efforts to 
maximise shareholder return could give company representatives incentives to report strategically. 
That means not reporting their best estimate at different stages of the life cycle of the petroleum 
field (e.g., resource estimates at the licensing stage and cost reports at the production stage), but 
selecting the outcome which will serve the company best. Strategic reporting should not be 
understood here as deceit or illegal behaviour. Petroleum operations are highly complex, both 
financially and technologically. Companies accordingly often operate without exact costs or 
reservoir sizes, but rather with qualified estimates of these. The data and measurement methods to 
be used can be open to discussion, and we are usually unable to relate to an objective truth. In 
these circumstances, the companies can opt not to report their best estimates but rather to act 
strategically by drawing on the datasets and measurement methods which best serve their interests. 
Legislation and regulations for the petroleum sector often contain formulations such as  best 
estimate , but assumed breaches of such provisions are generally impossible to prove.  
Asymmetric information is a genuine problem in most taxation and regulatory circumstances, 
but a number of special aspects of the petroleum industry mean that the government s information 
problem is greater here than in other sectors - a) because of the petroleum rent, the incentives for 
strategic reporting are greater on the NCS, and b) a vertically-integrated multinational petroleum 
company has greater opportunities for such behaviour
7. State participation and national oil 
companies can in part be seen as means for weakening the information asymmetries.  
To illustrate the problem associated with private information in the petroleum sector, we can 
first assume that the government has the same information as the companies (symmetric 
information). It will then be in a position to capture the whole petroleum rent without causing 
distortions in company dispositions. In other words, it will be able to levy a tax of 100 per cent on 
the net cash flow or financial profit, and this will 
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represent the optimum level of taxation. In reality, the tax system we observe is not like that.
8 At 
the same time, we see that a substantial staff has been built up in the petroleum tax office and the 
Norwegian Petroleum Directorate in part with the aim of checking company reporting of financial 
and technical data. In other words, the assumption of symmetric information is unrealistic. 
Tackling the information imbalance is one of the biggest challenges facing the resource 
management authorities.  
The problem of asymmetric information in the petroleum industry is analysed by Osmundsen 
(2005, 1998, 1995). It is argued here that the tax regime on the NCS has emerged to a much 
greater extent than on land as the result of a bargaining game between the companies and the 
government. This game is analysed within the framework of principal-agent theory (also known as 
regulation or incentive theory)
9. Petroleum deposits on the NCS are a collective resource which 
belongs to the whole community. In administering this resource, the Ministry of Petroleum and 
Energy acts as a principal on behalf of the Norwegian population. The petroleum companies are 
agents who are awarded production rights. In exchange, they pay taxes which benefit the 
community. The challenge for the government is to devise a tax and licensing system which 
collects a large proportion of the petroleum rent for the community while simultaneously giving 
the agents incentives to pursue exploration, development and production in an optimum manner 
from the principal s perspective.  
According to regulation theory, credible commitment is a great advantage. This is because an 
inability to make commitments reduces the government s opportunities to secure the revelation of 
the private information held by the companies, or means that such revelation will be costly for the 
government in the form of a lower level of taxation
10. The explanation lies in the ratchet effect.  
On the basis of private information, companies with low recovery costs (which may reflect 
high productivity or large petroleum reserves) will secure an information rent. This is because, 
instead of reporting their real costs, they can choose to pretend to be (imitate) a high-cost 
producer, e.g., by means of strategic transfer pricing. This will yield an economic rent on the basis 
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of the efficient company s absolute cost advantage. In a static model, the optimum under 
reasonable assumptions will be characterised by revelation (separating equilibrium). The company 
will be indifferent to whether it chooses revelation or imitation, and receives an information rent 
equal to the economic rent of the imitation strategy. In the transition to a dynamic model, a low-
cost producer will fear that revealing information in period one will mean heavier taxation and the 
elimination of the information rent in all future periods (the ratchet effect). If the government lacks 
opportunities to make credible commitments, the companies will therefore be unwilling to reveal 
their private information today. It is generally the case that a principal achieves the maximum 
welfare if they have opportunities to make credible commitments. This is because the commitment 
can be regarded as an extra means for bargaining. The opportunity set is widened, since 
commitment makes it possible to duplicate every contract which can be concluded without a 
credible commitment, and welfare increases.  
Because of the problem of the ratchet effect, a general outcome in regulation theory is that the 
optimum approach for the principal - if it has credibility - will be to undertake not to take 
advantage of the information revealed in the first period. This emerges from a model by Baron and 
Besanko (1984), where the private information parameter is not correlated over time and which 
shows that the optimum approach with commitment is to repeat the static (one-period) contract in 
each period. However, this model has limited relevance for the petroleum sector because it does 
not include the dynamics which relate to physical values.  
A more realistic approach in dynamic models for the production of non-renewable natural 
resources is for private information parameters to be correlated over time. Possible examples of 
private information parameters include the company s efficiency and quality or the size of the 
reservoir, and it is reasonable to assume that this information has a similar impact on production 
costs in the various periods
11. As discussed in section 2, it is also reasonable to assume that the 
government will lack credibility for an attempt to lock tax policy completely for the whole 
planning horizon.  
Laffont and Tirole (1988) show that it is difficult to achieve clear results in models with no 
commitment and correlated information parameters. This is because of the ratchet effect. Since the 
government cannot commit itself to abstain from collecting the whole information rent after 
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information is revealed in the first period, the company - in order to have adequate incentives to 
reveal its information - must be given a high information rent in the first period to compensate for 
future loss of profit. It could now be optimum for a company with poor efficiency or reserves to 
imitate a low-cost operator in period one and terminate its operations in period two when a more 
demanding contract is offered. The incentive constraint now binds in both directions, and not only 
upwards as in the static model or in one with commitment or independent information 
parameters
12. This gives very complex equilibrium properties. That applies to an even greater 
extent to petroleum regulation because of the additional dynamics provided by the resource 
constraint - high production in period one yields reduced reservoir pressure and thereby higher 
production costs in period two. As a result of this reserve effect, production costs are inter-
temporally correlated.  
Two articles model dynamic regulation of non-renewable natural resources under asymmetric 
information on production costs, and find unique equilibria by making simplified assumptions 
which eliminate the ratchet effect. In an article on mine operation, Gaudet et al (1995) assume 
uncorrelated information parameters - in other words, information on production costs in period 
two is assumed to be symmetrical at the date when the contract is concluded. This simplification 
allows the authors to analyse the case with an absence of credible commitment. In the other model, 
Osmundsen (1998) assumes credible commitment in order to be able to analyse a dynamic 
regulation problem in the petroleum industry with correlated information parameters. These two 
works also differ with regarded to modelling the inter-temporal effects which follow from resource 
taxation. While Gaudet et al impose a resource constraint which binds for certain parameter 
values, Osmundsen introduces a reserve-dependent and asymptomatic cost function (production 
costs decline with rising residual reserves, and move towards infinity as the resource base 
contracts towards zero) which implies that the resource constraint does not bind
13. This realistic 
assumption substantially simplifies the analysis. 
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Both models yield the result that, because information is asymmetric, the optimum approach 
(in relation to solutions with symmetric information) will be to distort both the overall scope and 
the pace of production in order to tax a larger proportion of the economic rent. In the case with 
commitment, this deviates from the well-established result that the optimum solution for the 
principal is to repeat the static contract - in other words, to distort overall production but not the 
production profile. See Baron and Besanko (1984). The reason why it will be optimal to distort the 
production decision is as follows: the difference in information rent for two companies with 
differing efficiencies is provided for a given quantity by the absolute cost difference for the 
relatively more efficient company. Assuming that not only average but also marginal costs decline 
with greater efficiency, we see that the relative cost difference and thereby the information rent are 
rising in quantity. As a consequence, the government can reduce the information rent for the 
companies (increase the tax rate on the economic rent) by reducing the quantity. The gain from 
reducing the information rent must be balanced against the loss incurred from sub-optimum 
production adjustments (distortions in overall quantity and production tempo)
14.  
As a result of the inter-temporal coupling of production costs owing to the resource 
constraint, it would not be optimal to repeat the static contract even with symmetric information. 
Moreover, in order to improve tax opportunities under asymmetric information, the optimum 
approach is to distort the production tempo because of type-dependent dynamics in production 
costs. Osmundsen (1998) assumes that the reserve effect is type-dependent - a reduction in 
production costs as a result of an increased holding of resources is greater for inefficient producers 
than for efficient ones. In other words, the level of efficiency and the residual holding are 
substitutes (dynamic single crossing property).  
Under certain circumstances, the models proposed by Gaudet et al and Osmundsen deviate 
with respect to the sign on the distortion in production pace. With a binding resource constraint in 
Gaudet et al (1995), it would be optimal for a set of company types to increase their pace of 
production. In Osmundsen (1998), however, the optimal approach is to reduce the pace of 
production for all types except from the most efficient. Gaudet et al find that it could also be 
optimal to distort the production decision for the company with the lowest costs. 
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A two-period production model implies that tax paid at the beginning of period one is a 
function of the production level in both periods - in other words, that we have a three-dimensional 
tax function. Through a generalisation of Laffont and Tirole (1986), Osmundsen (1998) shows that 
the optimum inter-temporal contract can be implemented with a menu of tangent plans generated 
by licence fees and royalty for each period. Traditional theory on resource taxation advises against 
production-distorting royalty. This theory, which assumes symmetric information, prescribes 
neutral tax
15. With asymmetric information, however, we are in a next-best situation where a 
distorting tax could be optimal, as the distortion of the companies  production decision alleviates 
the information problem.  
4. The Norwegian model for resource management and taxation
16 
Norway has a discretionary licensing system. A regulatory framework has been established 
whereby oil companies have ideas and carry out the technical work necessary to recover the 
resources, but their activities also require approval from the authorities. Such approval is needed at 
all stages from exploration drilling through plans for development and operation to 
decommissioning proposals for fields.  
The government receives significant revenues from the petroleum industry, with 31 per cent 
of its total income deriving from this sector in 2007. According to the revised national planning 
budget for 2008, the estimated value of remaining petroleum reserves on the NCS is NOK 3 790 
billion in 2008 money. The government receives a large share of the value created through: 
 
taxation of oil and gas activities 
 
royalties and fees 
 
direct ownership in fields on the Norwegian continental shelf (through the State s Direct 
Financial Interest - SDFI) 
 
dividends from its shareholdings in the StatoilHydro oil company
17  
Petroleum taxation is based on the Norwegian rules for ordinary corporation tax. Owing to the 
extraordinary profitability associated with production of Norwegian petroleum resources, a special 
                    
 
15 See, for example, Garnaut and Ross (1975). 
16 This section is based on Facts 2008 - the Norwegian petroleum sector by the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy and 
the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate. 
17  StatoilHydro is an international oil company in which the Norwegian state holds the majority of the shares.  
 
tax is also levied on income from these activities. The ordinary tax rate is 28 per cent, the same as 
for land-based activities, while the special tax rate is 50 per cent. When calculating taxable income 
for both ordinary and special taxes, an investment is subject to depreciation on a linear basis over 
six years from the date it was made. Companies may deduct all relevant expenses for exploration, 
research and development, net finance, operation, decommissioning and so forth. Consolidation 
between fields is permitted.   
In order to shield normal return from the special tax, an extra deduction - the uplift - is 
allowed in the calculation base for special tax. This amounts to 30 per cent of investment (7.5 per 
cent per annum for four years from the year the investment was made). The uplift is designed so 
that the marginal tax on cost (in net present value terms) is equal to the marginal tax of income. 
Companies which are not in a tax position may carry forward their losses and the uplift with 
interest. An application may also be made for a refund of the fiscal value of exploration costs in 
the company s tax return.   
The petroleum tax system has been designed to provide neutrality, so that an investment 
project which is profitable for an investor before tax will also be profitable after tax. This makes it 
possible to harmonise the desire to secure significant revenues for the community with the 
requirement to provide sufficient post-tax profitability for the companies.  
5. Government commitment opportunities and today s Norwegian practice 
As discussed in section 2, a number of special conditions in the petroleum industry make it 
difficult for the government to commit to a fixed tax policy on the NCS. Nor do any international 
institutional relations exist which could solve the problem. In section 3 I discussed, on the basis of 
the theory of repeated games, whether the government could achieve an effective commitment 
through reputational effects. A common denominator of repeated game models is that they depend 
on the government being a patient player if it is to overcome the problem of under-investment 
fully. A sitting government may perhaps be patient while in office, but the length of that stay is 
uncertain. Because of the long planning horizon on the NCS, the period a government is in office - 
even if its re-election is expected - will probably be short in relation to the relevant time frame for 
petroleum investment.  
 
 
However, the economic models which have been reviewed cover only the extreme points: 
where possible, the principal will want to make a full commitment in tax policy; if not, it will want 
to conduct a fully opportunistic policy - in other words, confiscatory taxes will be levied on 
irreversible and specific investments. Reality will undoubtedly lie somewhere between these 
extremes, and variations in policy can be seen between different resource-owning countries.  
A pragmatic approach to economic theory on commitment could be that the highest possible 
consistency over time in taxation is desirable, even in conditions where full commitment is not 
possible. Future taxation of an individual field should therefore be as predictable as possible, and 
efforts should be made to avoid frequent ad hoc changes in the tax regime. Similarly, efforts 
should be made to avoid ratchet effects.  
The large scale of private investment and the substantial number of new licence applications 
indicate that the Norwegian government has succeeded in establishing a credible commitment to a 
reasonable level of taxation for the petroleum industry. It can hardly be claimed today that overall 
investments are too low - the level of activity is at record levels, first of all by massive investments 
to increase production from the existing fields (increased oil recovery). Determining whether 
unexpected tax changes might have prompted selective under-investment or speeded-up 
production on individual fields is more difficult. Exploration activity, which provides the best 
indicator of confidence in future frame conditions, has been weak for a number of years, and new 
stand-alone developments are few. As always, it is difficult here to distinguish between the effect 
of fiscal termsand company assessments of the prospectivity of the NCS in a more mature phase. It 
would in any event be relevant to ask whether the same development and production could have 
been achieved - but with a higher tax take - if a greater degree of commitment in tax policy could 
have been established.   
Norwegian petroleum tax policy has been entirely stable in recent years, despite the dramatic 
rise in the oil price. That contrasts with most other producer countries, even ones like the UK, 
where we have seen several considerable ad hoc tax increases. The stability of Norwegian frame 
conditions must accordingly be regarded as an important element underlying the fact that the 
country has succeeded in maintaining the level of activity on the NCS - with an unchanged level of 
taxation - even though the prospectivity (i.e., the amount, quality and extraction costs of oil and 
gas in the remaining reservoirs) of parts of these waters has declined. In today s economic setting,  
 
stable frame conditions will represent an important competitive edge for the NCS. The new system 
of cash refunds for the fiscal value of exploration costs in company tax returns has proved 
effective in attracting new players to the NCS. This is because the capital required for making a 
commitment in Norway has been substantially reduced in that the government directly refunds 
around three-quarters of exploration expenditures, i.e., the companies do not have to be in a tax-
paying position to receive the government s part of the investment. For a sector which is currently 
very concerned with reserve replacement, this system can yield good additions to reserves in 
relation to the effective capital outlay. The Norwegian framework also allows companies to book 
the entire reserves in a field, unlike the position in countries with production sharing agreements 
where only cost and profit oil can be booked.   
5.1 Changes to tax policy over time 
Norway s earlier petroleum tax policy was to tailor taxes and licence requirements to prevailing 
economic conditions in the industry - in other words, to adapt the tax system to developments in 
costs, technology, proven recoverable reserves, foreign exchange rates and petroleum prices. The 
policy of tailoring the tax system could give the impression of being a political rule which 
effectively commits the government on petroleum taxation. This is not entirely the case, since the 
policy is discretionary and accordingly does not represent a complete state-contingent contract. 
The purpose of this implicit contract is to attract new investment. Since the price of petroleum 
measured in Norwegian kroner has the highest volatility among these economic factors and 
moreover represents a systematic risk, tax changes have typically occurred in the event of price 
rises (tax increases in 1975 and 1980) and reductions (tax cuts in 1986); all of them applying both 
to existing and new projects. However, each of these tax revisions has also taken account of 
changes in costs and technology as well as new estimates of recoverable reserves; on a sector 
basis.  
Lund (1971) argues that the most important reason why tailoring the tax system is necessary 
is that it is not fully neutral. In cases of neutrality, the tax base will be identical with the petroleum 
rent, and will therefore exercise no distorting effects on development and operational decisions. A 
non-neutral system produces distortions, and these become more serious when prices fall. An  
 
important example of this in the previous Norwegian petroleum tax system was the non-linearity 
provided by incomplete tax deductions for losses. The latter can be carried forward, but are not 
compensated for the alternative cost of the capital. This is a particular problem in the petroleum 
industry because of the long time lag between exploration and the start to production. If the 
company fails to reach a taxable position, losses could never be deducted.  
Another reason for choosing a tailored tax system is the political constraints imposed by voter 
dislike of large profits and high dividends at private petroleum companies. That places effective 
constraints on how much risk the government can transfer to the companies. A full commitment in 
tax policy would probably have meant high profits and dividends for the private companies in 
good times. To avoid this, the tax system is tailored in such a way that company profits are more 
evened-out. This gives the impression of efficient taxation. However, a substantial proportion of 
the risk is transferred to the government
18.  
The earlier petroleum tax regime on the NCS resembles the equitable mechanism described in 
Baron (1989). This mechanism lies between full commitment and pure opportunism. In Baron s 
model, the private company is free to withdraw from the business relationship in each period, and 
the government is unable to commit to a fixed future policy. The parties conclude a voluntary 
agreement, whereby the company renounces the right to withdraw from the business relationship, 
and the principal in return places restrictions on its opportunism. Because of major irreversible and 
specific investments on the NCS, the companies do not have opportunities for withdrawing from 
the business. Instead, they can refuse to participate in new licensing rounds. Until the NCS has 
been completely developed, the government will therefore have an incentive to limit its 
opportunism.  
The equitable mechanism can represent an opportunity in conditions where full commitment 
in the form of fully state-contingent contracts is not possible. It is worth noting that this 
mechanism does not entirely resolve the commitment problem, since it requires that the principal 
is in a position to give credible guarantees on non-negative profits to the companies after they have 
revealed their information on costs and reservoirs, or after an irreversible and specific investment 
has been made. Baron s response to this is to assume that the equitable mechanism takes the form 
of a written contract between the parties, and that procedural demands and legal precedence limit 
                    
 
18 Optimal risk sharing between government and companies under financial, information and political constraints is an 
important subject which deserves closer study.  
 
the government s opportunities to change this ex post. This could be relevant in our context, since 
procedural requirements in Norwegian law protect companies on the NCS from arbitrary and 
opportunistic action by the regulator. However, key elements in the regulation of the petroleum 
sector do not take the form of explicit legal contracts, but are instead implicit contracts between 
the ministry and the industry. Rather than binding legal agreements, Norway s international 
obligations can protect the companies to some extent against arbitrary treatment. Similarly, the 
threat of diplomatic problems and economic penalties from other countries can have a disciplinary 
effect on tax policy towards foreign companies.  
The controversial issue of asymmetric treatment of old and new fields with regard to royalty 
is relevant to the discussion on commitment. As noted by Lund (1991), a negative royalty was 
introduced in the 1986-87 tax reform following a drop in the price of petroleum. However, this 
applied only to licences with a development plan approved after January 1986. That represents an 
asymmetry, since the tax increases of 1975 and 1980 (which were implemented in the wake of 
price increases) embraced all fields. This recalls the ratchet effects described in section 3, and can 
be regarded as an opportunistic policy - high tax on irrevocable investments. This practice 
undermines the credibility of the government s implicit tax contract. The problem is that tax 
changes are made on an ad hoc basis. If progressivity is an important goal for the government, it 
would be better from that perspective to construct a clearly defined and stable progressive tax 
system.  
Lund (1991) concludes that this asymmetric tax policy will, all other factors being equal, 
reduce the interest of the companies in new licences. In order to maintain the level of investment, 
the government must reduce its required tax take. It would have been possible to maintain a higher 
level of taxes if the government avoided a reputation for asymmetric taxation. I support that 
conclusion, and would add that credibility in taxation is becoming ever more important as the 
number of fields remaining to be developed falls. It should be emphasised that this conclusion has 
been reached on the basis of a pragmatic attitude to established economic theory in the field.  
The principle of uniform taxation of all fields, old and new, which was established in 
Proposition no 12 (1991-92) to the Odelsting division of the Storting can be regarded as an attempt 
to secure a reputation for non-discrimination
19. It must be emphasised that the problem of time-
                    
 
19 Despite this statement on uniformity, the differential treatment of fields developed before and after 1 January 1986 
remains. On the other hand, no new asymmetries have been proposed.  
 
inconsistent taxation does not lie in the fact that different tax levels are assessed for different 
fields, but that taxation of the individual field is not consistent over time - in other words, that the 
tax system responds asymmetrically to price rises and falls over the production period. Taxes are 
increased when prices rise, but not reduced to the same degree when they fall. A lack of neutrality 
in the tax system would eventually necessitate a lower effective tax rate in order to secure the 
development of marginal fields. If the tax take from existing profitable fields is simultaneously to 
be protected, a system of differentiated field taxation would emerge
20. It is worth noting that 
making a credible commitment to equality of effective taxation of profitable and marginal fields 
can create the opposite of the ratchet effect. Through such a commitment, the companies would 
expect the government to reduce the tax burden in future in order to secure the development of 
marginal fields. With equal treatment, this would also apply to very profitable fields which are 
already in production. We could then get a position where the effective tax burden is higher in the 
development phase than during production - in other words, that development expenses are 
deductible from a higher rate of tax than is later levied on operating revenues. That could yield a 
socio-economic loss in the form of over-investment on the NCS.  
A development has taken place in the Norwegian petroleum tax system over the past decade, 
from an approach tailored to the prevailing oil price to a fixed regime independent of that price. 
This trend towards a greater degree of commitment in frame conditions coincides with shifts 
towards an even more neutral tax system, which reduces the need for tax adjustments when oil 
prices move. Among the modifications which have yielded greater neutrality are the ability to 
carry losses forward with a risk free interest rate, opportunities for transferring tax-related losses 




Although a number of special factors make commitment difficult in petroleum taxation, a certain 
degree of credibility can be achieved through practising stable and reasonable levels of taxes over 
time. An important reason why the Norwegian government has so far achieved credibility is that 
                    
 
20 Such variation has already been introduced by allowing the State s Direct Financial Interest to vary from field to 
field. 
21 See Bjerkedal and Johnsen (2005).  
 
the desire to secure the development of a substantial number of new fields has had a disciplinary 
effect on the taxation of producing fields. As the NCS matures, with fewer new fields in line for 
development, the government will depend on a reputation as a predictable and reasonable tax 
collector to avoid under-investment. The signs are that the Norwegian government has succeeded 
in building a reputation for consistent field taxation over time. However, such reputation is easily 
lost, and thus the Norwegian government continuously needs to take tax credibility into account in 
tax decisions. According to contract theory, a commitment of this kind - providing it is regarded as 
credible by the companies - will yield a higher tax take from the petroleum sector. Norwegian 
petroleum taxation has been very stable in recent years despite sharp oil price rises. Frequent tax 
increases in other resource-owning countries have thereby enhanced the competitiveness of the 
NCS.  
We can say that Norway originally made an implicit promise to the oil industry concerning a 
reasonable level of taxation. This was achieved by adjusting tax rates at regular intervals and 
tailoring them to the industry s overall economic position. In other words, we can say that 
commitment exists in tax policy even if the level of taxation varies over time. The important 
consideration in this context is that the tax changes follow a specific rule and that they are 
symmetrical. If they are asymmetrical - in that taxes rise more readily with higher prices than they 
fall with lower prices - the implicit promise to the industry will have been broken. There have been 
few such breaches in Norwegian oil history. The problem with many of the tax changes we see 
today in a number of producer countries is that they do not follow a specific rule and are perceived 
in a number of cases as arbitrary. It should be noted that credibility is not necessarily at odds with 
progressive taxation, as long as the progressive elements are part of the initial tax contract. 
However, progressivity may in some cases have detrimental incentive effects.  
Over the past decade, Norway has shifted to a policy of absolute commitment, where the tax 
system is unchanging. This has been made possible by changes which ensure that the regime is 
neutral. Changes to the tax system in response to distortions caused by the same system are 
thereby avoided. However, a number of industry participants and external analysts believe that the 
Norwegian government will have to reduce taxes if the oil price falls to a sufficiently low level.  
Generally speaking, an underlying cause of frequent ad hoc changes in petroleum taxation is a 
distorting tax system which needs to be adjusted when the oil price moves substantially. Another  
 
reason for the lack of commitment and credibility in petroleum taxation may have been that this 
regime is governed by relatively short-term considerations, with great weight given to the tax take 
in the present budget year or in the government s period of office. A third cause of tax adjustments 
could be various national considerations which override pragmatic evaluations concerning the 
maximisation of the tax take from the petroleum sector.  
On a general basis, the conclusion is that petroleum tax should be shaped in a long-term 
perspective with the emphasise on credibility and predictability. However, this does not mean that 
all the elements in the Norwegian petroleum tax regime are suitable for all types of producer 
countries. Norway s petroleum taxation has changed over time on a couple of significant points. 
The system has become more neutral, e.g., by tax refunds of exploration costs. As a consequence, 
the Norwegian government has steadily accepted more risk, which can be seen as a logical 
consequence of higher wealth.  This calls for considerable financial strength, which not all 
producer countries possess. When operations began on the NCS, the Norwegian government 
utilised mechanisms such as carried interest and the sliding scale, which reduced its capital 
requirements and exposure to risk. The Norwegian model is also based on many detailed and 
discretionary contracts between the regulatory authorities and the oil companies on such issues as 
the determination of licence awards, norm prices22, deductible expenses and production permits. 
This makes very heavy demands on the expertise and integrity of the government administration. 
If such expertise and integrity are not fully present, simpler and more transparent administrative 
models would be preferable.  
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